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Article 
THE CASE AGAINST PROPERTY RIGHTS IN OLD 
INTANGIBLE INDIGENOUS CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 
Dennis S. Karjala∗ 
Robert K. Paterson∗∗ 
NOTE—This article expands on a chapter to be published as “The Failed 
Case for Property Rights in Intangible Indigenous Cultural Property”, in 
Christoph Antons and William Logan (eds.) Intellectual Property, Cultural 
Property and Intangible Cultural Heritage (Routledge, forthcoming, 2017). 
 
ABSTRACT—This article critically reviews some of the recent literature 
calling for intellectual property rights in indigenous cultural knowledge. In 
an earlier piece, we argued generally against the notion of defining a new 
class of “indigenous cultural property” analogous to copyright and patent 
rights. Rather, we must analyze demands for more protection for old 
cultural property by building from the ground up, using judicial 
interpretation or carefully tailored statutory amendments to determine 
whether the work in question is one that should be protected by a new right 
and, if so, deciding both the scope and term of protection. Intellectual 
property involves a tradeoff between rewarding the legitimate demands for 
protection and society’s overall interest in allowing information generally 
to be used freely. Hence the term of protection for both patent and 
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copyright has always been limited. Here we review some of the 
commentary that has appeared in the interim seeking to establish rights in 
old cultural property. We conclude that many of the assumptions 
underlying calls for such protection cannot withstand critical analysis and 
that a one-size-fits-all definition of indigenous cultural property is both 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier work,1 we argued that resolving the problem of protecting 
intangible indigenous cultural heritage should not take the form of defining 
a new class of “indigenous cultural property” that would be subject to 
rights under, or analogous to, those recognized by the intellectual property 
regimes of patent and copyright. We concluded, rather, that a “one size fits 
all” approach was incapable of balancing the tensions between 
understandable demands from indigenous peoples to have control over their 
cultural heritage, on the one hand, and fundamental policy values reflected 
in the intellectual property regimes and in basic notions of free expression, 
on the other. We outlined a number of specific situations in which careful 
judicial interpretation of existing laws or modest amendments to existing 
statutory regimes can meet many of the needs and demands of indigenous 
peoples. In many cases, there is no fundamental clash between western 
legal traditions and the legitimate demands for privacy, confidentiality, or 
recognition that indigenous claimants might make. In some cases, however, 
especially those involving outsider use of publicly available but “old” 
indigenous works (that is, those works no longer protected by copyright), 
attempting to give control to the group is fundamentally antithetical to 
 
 1 See generally Robert K Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in 
Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 633 (2003). 
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basic notions of free expression and the overall development and 
dissemination of culture.2 For such cases, a value judgment must be made. 
We concluded that a regime of perpetual rights in the indigenous group 
from which the work derived is both practically impossible and 
theoretically unsound: “[I]ndigenous cultural tradition must give way to the 
modern creative spirit.”3 
Since our article appeared, there has been a good deal of activity, both 
at the United Nations and in various countries.4 In addition, the 
commentators have been active.5 Most approaches, however, continue 
down the path of asserting that western legal concepts are “inappropriate” 
to meet the needs of indigenous peoples and therefore must be modified in 
one way or another. An implicit assumption in many of these commentaries 
is that “indigenous peoples” do, in fact, have some common needs or 
demands that are in conflict with “western” traditions. They also seem to 
assume that all members within a particular indigenous culture have the 
same goals with respect to the use, by insiders or outsiders, of the group’s 
intangible heritage. To the extent a given proposal does rely on inter- or 
intra-group homogeneity, we are skeptical that it can provide a meaningful 
general resolution. Some groups might find, for example, that the 
commodification of their music or certain artistic images is offensive on 
religious grounds. Others might find the same use offensive simply because 
it is, in their opinion, in bad taste. Others might not object to the 
commodification so much as to their exclusion from the profits derived 
from it.6 
Another problem that remains extant in the literature is the general 
assumption that “indigenous cultural property” can be defined in a 
meaningful way and that the individuals or groups who are to be given a 
certain degree of control rights can be identified. There is also an implicit 
assumption that these control rights can be appropriately circumscribed to 
assure that those in control do, in fact, exercise their power with the goals 
and needs of the group in mind.7 
 
 2 Id. at 670 
 3 Id. at 670. 
 4 We discuss below developments in New Zealand, Taiwan, and the Pacific Islands. See infra 
pp.18–27. 
 5 The stewardship model in application to intangible property is discussed extensively, see infra 
Part A. Other commentary is discussed more briefly, see infra Parts B–D. - 
 6 See Yuqin Jin, Note, Necessity: Enacting Laws to Protect Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights 
in the United States, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 950, 955–59 (2011) (reporting disputes 
between related tribes over ownership of the knowledge in question and raising the question of who can 
legitimately represent indigenous people). 
 7 See Marilyn Strathern, Multiple Perspectives on Intellectual Property, in PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL, BIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL PROPERTY IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 47, 52 (Kathy Whimp 
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One of the more important commentaries on these topics attempts to 
obviate some of these difficulties by reframing rights in indigenous cultural 
property within traditional western property law concepts.8 Professors 
Carpenter et al. offer the notion of “stewardship” as a limitation on 
ownership rights in cultural property, both tangible and intangible, so that 
an “owner” of property might not necessarily be able to use it to the full 
extent otherwise allowed but would negotiate with relevant cultural groups 
or their representatives over uses that impinge on aspects of the group’s 
cultural heritage that the group has an obligation to maintain. 
Unfortunately, however, while Professors Carpenter et al. give a number of 
examples to show how their stewardship model would work, they actually 
pay scant attention to the problem of intangible cultural property 
(discussing in detail only the problem of sports mascots). Professors 
Carpenter et al. supply no definition of what property is covered, who 
exercises the rights of stewardship, or how such rights are to be determined 
or delimited (except by way of ad hoc example). We believe that it is 
imperative to distinguish carefully between tangible and intangible 
property. We do not see how the stewardship model – as a limitation on 
property rights – applies even to the main intangible property problem that 
they address, which is that of sports mascots. More important, for 
traditional designs, music, dance, literature, and other graphic arts, we must 
distinguish between a demand for regulation on offensiveness grounds and 
a demand for revenue sharing. Not only must we decide who does the 
“stewarding” and on what basis, but we must also decide on what basis, if 
any, a new design based on an indigenous “style” gives right to a claim. 
For plants or even human DNA, what is there to “steward” except a stream 
of profits, to a part of which indigenous people are assumed to be entitled? 
The failure to distinguish tangible from intangible property in these 
situations is, in our minds, fatal to the enterprise insofar as intangible 
cultural heritage is concerned. 
In this article, we undertake a critical review of some of the 
commentary on, as well as actual and proposed legal developments relating 
to, indigenous cultural property that have appeared since our earlier 
contribution. We remain convinced that a coherent approach to the problem 
of intangible cultural property protection must lie in a set of carefully 
articulated statements of the problem in specifically delineated cases. 
 
& Mark Busse eds., 2013) (ebook) (“Even if a group can be identified, who belongs to the group? Who 
is the representative to speak on its behalf? What about power inequalities between different interests 
within the group?”). 
 8 See generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 
118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009) [hereinafter referred to as “Professors Carpenter et al”]. 
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Reasonable people will disagree about the appropriate resolution in many 
of these cases, but it is only through such articulation that resolution is to 
be found. Continued search for a one-size-fits-all approach to “intangible 
indigenous cultural property,” we believe, amounts to chasing a will-o’-the-
wisp. 
I.? THE BASIC PROBLEM OF INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE 
PROTECTION 
It is important to emphasize that we consider here the problem of 
control over intangibles–most broadly speaking, information. We are not 
dealing with real property, such as geographical locations that are sacred or 
otherwise culturally meaningful to one or more indigenous groups. Nor are 
we dealing with tangible personal property, such as carvings, rugs, pots, 
jewelry, clothing, paintings, and the like. Rather, we address whether and 
under what circumstances an indigenous group justifiably may assert 
control rights over such intangibles as music, designs, pictures, stories, and 
methods of medical treatment. 
There are important reasons that we single out information for special 
treatment in the discussion of protecting indigenous cultural heritage. 
Rights in information–especially property rights in information–are a 
relatively new concept in human development. Copying successful 
behavior is something humans have done from time immemorial, and 
indeed copying successful behaviors has been shown to be a strategy that 
can win over a strategy of innovating.9 It is unlikely that the first person to 
come up with the idea of attaching rounded stones to some sort of axle felt 
entitled to royalties whenever this invention was used to move heavy 
boulders to erect ancient monuments and other buildings. The notion of 
patents in new technology–property rights in information–seems to be a 
product of the Renaissance, when a Venetian statute was adopted to 
encourage the building and disclosure of “any new and ingenious device” 
by granting a 10-year period of exclusive rights.10 And, of course, until the 
invention of the printing press, it was so difficult to copy an extensive work 
of literature that no need was seen for anything like copyright. In other 
words, over most of human history, the absence of exclusive rights in 
 
 9 Elizabeth Pennisi, Conquering by Copying, 329 SCI. 165 (2010) (describing a computer 
tournament in which, at each turn, teams could either observe another’s behavior, exploit a known 
behavior, or innovate a new behavior); see Dennis S. Karjala, “Copying” and “Piracy” in the Digital 
Age, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 245, 247 n.7 (2013). Recent observations among nonhuman primates has also 
shown the development and dissemination of “culture” by observation and copying. 
 10 Craig Allen Nard, THE LAW OF PATENTS 9–11 (3d ed. 2014). 
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information was the default position–almost certainly in every geographical 
region and in every culture. 
And there is a good and easily understandable reason for 
distinguishing information from tangible articles: information is nonrival. 
Exclusive property rights in tangibles are arguably more conducive to 
economic efficiency because they help avoid “overgrazing” and the tragedy 
of the commons.11 Although most will tire of hearing the same song over 
and over again, information cannot be overgrazed in the depletion sense, 
and the creator of a song remains just as free to sing or perform it after 
another learns it as before. Consequently, exclusive rights in information 
are not necessary to prevent the information from being used up too rapidly 
or inefficiently.12 If we are to recognize exclusive rights in information, we 
need reasons that do not rely on scarcity, which distinguishes information 
from most of the resource allocation and distribution problems that 
economists typically consider. 
While no one seriously disputes these premises, the legal community 
has seen ongoing debate over the reasons that we do, in fact, recognize 
intellectual property rights (IPRs). The reasons are important because they 
determine not only whether information of a particular type is protected at 
all but also the scope of any protection that is afforded, including the term 
of such protection. We protect trade secrets in the interest of stimulating 
economic efficiency by allowing the relatively free flow of information 
within a firm and in the interest of preventing economic waste that would 
otherwise go into self-help protection measures. Consistent with these 
purposes, trade secret protection lapses when the secret becomes known 
outside the firm, whether by authorized or unauthorized disclosure from 
within or by independent discovery.13 Similarly, traditional trademark law 
protects against the unauthorized use of a mark to “pass off” goods or 
services as those of the mark owner, but only if there is a likelihood of 
confusion by the consuming public. This allows mark owners to invest in 
 
 11 E.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 351–52 
(1967); Peter S. Menell, Governance of Intellectual Resources and Disintegration of Intellectual 
Property in the Digital Age, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1533-34 (2011). 
 12 Professor Landes and Judge Posner have argued that perpetual copyright may be useful in 
protecting great works of art, literature, and music from becoming debased through over performance 
and display. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 471, 485–88 (2003). Their theory, however, does not stand up to scrutiny. Dennis S. Karjala, 
Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1076–85 (2006). 
 13 Because of this limitation, it is difficult to classify trade secret information as “property.” Trade 
secret law simply protects against acquisition of the information by unlawful means, but it gives no 
exclusive right in the information as such. See Lynn Sharp Paine, Trade Secrets and the Justification of 
Intellectual Property: A Comment on Hettinger, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 247, 257 (1991) (concluding that 
the concept of property is not necessary to justify the rights of trade secret). 
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building their reputations with good quality products and services and 
assists consumers in rapidly finding products and services in whose quality 
they have confidence. While the term of trademark protection is indefinite 
(and therefore potentially infinite), the very narrow scope of protection 
severely limits trademark’s encroachment into the public domain, even if 
we include trademark as an “intellectual property” statute.14 In the case of 
both trademark and trade secret law, therefore, we know what the 
protection goals are and this informs the decision concerning what types of 
information to protect, how such protection should be limited and by what 
means, and against what actions by third parties protection will be 
available. 
The patent and copyright regimes are much more general in their 
protection of information. Patent law protects new technological advances, 
while traditional copyright protects works of authorship–art, literature, and 
music. Because an exclusive right to a desirable product permits the 
rightowner to charge a price above marginal cost, the exclusive rights of 
patent and copyright do inhibit consumption of works embodying the 
subject of the right, resulting in a “deadweight” social loss (in the sense 
that there are some people who would be willing to pay the marginal cost 
of production or even more but not the higher price charged by the 
rightowner). We accept these deadweight losses from the patent and 
copyright regimes because we fear that a failure to grant such rights to 
inventors and authors would result in less public availability of socially 
desirable works. In other words, we afford the exclusive rights of patent 
and copyright as an incentive to inventors and authors to create new 
inventions and works of authorship.15 In affording this incentive, both 
regimes attempt to be mindful as well of the problem of cumulative 
innovation: first-generation works often serve as inputs for second-
generation innovations.16 Consequently, the stronger the rights afforded to 
the first innovator, the lower the incentive for follow-on creators to build 
on the earlier work. 
 
 14 See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (“There is no such thing 
as property in a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in 
connection with which the mark is employed.”); see also Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? 
Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2005) (noting that a 
trademark in the public domain is essentially useless to anyone, because it can no longer serve its 
signaling function). Admittedly, the recent extension of trademark law to the protection of famous 
marks against “dilution” brings trademark closer to a “property” regime. 
 15 Menell, supra note 11, at 1534–35. 
 16 Id. at 1535. 
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The details of patent and copyright protection depend on the nature of 
the information (subject matter) protected.17 In the United States, copyright 
arises automatically upon fixation of copyright subject matter – works of 
authorship – in a tangible medium. The scope of copyright protection is 
defined by the vague idea/expression dichotomy – copyright protects only 
the expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. Copyright infringement is 
determined by the equally vague “substantial similarity” standard, and the 
term of copyright protection endures for seventy years after the death of the 
author. Patents, on the other hand, cover works of technology and issue 
only upon formal application and after examination by a skilled examiner 
for novelty and nonobviousness. The scope of patent protection is defined 
and narrowly limited by the claims, and the term of patent protection is 
only 20 years from filing. The reason that these two regimes, which have 
similar goals of promoting the general welfare by granting limited-term 
exclusive rights in information, are so different in their operational detail 
inheres in the respective natures of the information they protect: patent 
protects functional works of technology, while traditional copyright 
protects nonfunctional works of authorship.18 While many believe that the 
current term of copyright protection is too long, nearly all agree that the 
patent term must be shorter than that for copyright because so much 
technology builds incrementally on what has already been invented and 
made available. 
The point is that intangible property – information – is given certain 
degrees of protection depending on the nature of the information and 
overall social goals. The default position is that information is free for 
anyone to use as he or she will. With trade secret law, society seeks to 
improve economic efficiency with respect to information that, in any event, 
would not be made available to the public, by reducing the effort the 
possessor of the information must make to keep the information of value. 
With trademark law, society cabins off a tiny bit of information so that it 
can serve a signaling function for offerors of goods and services and their 
customers. With patent and copyright, society seeks to supply an incentive 
to create new and desirable works, with the details depending crucially on 
whether the information relates to technological function or to the 
nonfunctional world of art, literature, and music.19 Thus, any call to protect 
 
 17 Dennis S. Karjala, Distinguishing Patent and Copyright Subject Matter, 35 CONN. L. REV. 439 
(2003). 
 18 Id. at 448–58. 
 19 Computer software presents a special case in which functional works are protected under 
copyright. One of the current authors has written extensively on this point. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karjala, 
supra note 17; Dennis S. Karjala, A Coherent Theory for the Copyright Protection of Computer 
Software and Recent Judicial Interpretations, 66 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 53 (1997). This special case 
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information that does not fall within traditional information-protection 
regimes needs to supply a reason both for protection at all and for the 
specific scope and duration of such protection. We do not believe that a 
single rationale exists for protection of a broad category of information 
under the rubric of “indigenous cultural heritage.” We do believe, however, 
that reasons can be given for a degree of protection of specific types of 
information that many would classify as “indigenous cultural heritage.” It 
is simply a matter of articulating the need for protection in terms beyond “I 
would like to have exclusive rights in X.” (We would each like to have 
exclusive rights to, say, the works of Shakespeare.) Once the necessity or 
desirability case has been made, we can set about limiting both the scope 
and duration of protection to meet the articulated need, subject to 
countervailing interests of the public for allowing the information to remain 
in the public domain. 
The basic problem for cultural heritage protection does not, therefore, 
lie in the absence of a known single author or group of authors. If a 
legitimate basis for protection can be articulated, it is relatively easy to 
write statutory language that accomplishes the task.20 Similarly, the 
problem does not inhere in the absence of a writing or other fixation of the 
work, such as stories handed down by means of oral tradition. While it is 
true that the United States does require fixation for the attachment of 
federal copyright protection, most countries do not have a fixation 
requirement, and even within the United States unfixed works may be 
protected, at least against unauthorized publication, by state law.21 The real 
problem for intangible cultural heritage protection, as a general matter, is 
that it requires us to go beyond patent and copyright, and beyond the 
default position that information is in the public domain, to protect 
information for an indefinite, potentially infinite, time. We know why 
nonprotection is the default position for information, and we know why 
 
that brings technological subject matter under copyright instead of its traditional home in patent law has 
no relevance to the cultural property question, except perhaps to show that copyright can, in fact, make 
room for special cases when there are reasons to do so. 
 20 For example, Article 15(4)(a) of the Berne Convention provides that members may designate an 
author’s representative to enforce the copyright rights of an unknown author from that country. Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Art. 15(4)(a) (Paris text 1971), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698#P192_37445 [https://perma.cc/DH2S-MLCP]. 
A student commentator has advocated the application of state tort law, in the United States, to culturally 
based harms resulting from sociological research, recognizing the difficulty of proving group harm but 
suggesting arguments that might be accepted. Gerald Carr, Comment, Protecting Intangible Cultural 
Resources: Alternatives to Intellectual Property Law, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (2013). Of course, 
while we do not necessarily advocate such a statute, a statute narrowly tailored to achieve this end 
would be even more effective. 
 21 See. e.g., Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law: Exploding 
the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1119 (1983). 
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(more or less) we make limited exceptions to that position for patent and 
copyright. If we are to go beyond the boundaries of these two paradigms, 
we must know why we are doing so.22 
II.? SOME CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION 
A.? The Stewardship Model 
A good deal of attention has been directed toward the so-called 
“stewardship model” for cultural property proposed by Professors Kristen 
A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal and Angela R. Riley.23 This ambitious 
proposal argues that many problems of cultural heritage protection can be 
analyzed and resolved using the traditional concepts of property law. These 
authors correctly observe that title to property, tangible or intangible, has 
never given the property owner an absolute right to use, or even to exclude 
others from, the property. “Stewardship” is seen as a limitation on an 
owner’s rights designed to reconcile the interests of owners and nonowners. 
The notion is that indigenous people often have a fiduciary or custodial 
duty with respect to certain tangible and intangible properties and that the 
cultural survival of a group may depend on its ability to fulfill such duties.24 
Consequently, legal ownership rights would be modified or curtailed to 
some extent, presumably to the extent needed to permit the indigenous 
groups to fulfill their custodial duties. 
We have no objection as a general matter to limitations on owners’ 
rights in tangible or intangible property that are designed to permit the 
carrying out of inherited custodial duties, especially if the survival of an 
entire culture depends on it. The problem is in the details, few of which 
Professors Carpenter et al. supply, especially for intangible property. Their 
basic idea stems from the claim that “certain property deserves legal 
protection because it is integral to the collective survival and identity of 
indigenous groups.”25 This is followed by the claim that “[i]ndigenous 
 
 22 Professor Michael Brown has proffered an “ecological approach” to draw an appropriate balance 
between the two desirable goals of protecting cultural heritage and promoting free and open expression 
throughout society. Michael F. Brown, Heritage Trouble: Recent Work on the Protection of Intangible 
Cultural Property, 12 INTERNAT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 40, 51 (2005). He would allow, as would we, 
greater protection for sacred information under conditions of confidentiality designed to secure 
intangible cultural heritage, provided such schemes do not impinge too greatly on democratic values. Id. 
at 52. We assume he would be equally amenable to schemes designed to protect an articulated 
indigenous interest, at least if they are narrowly limited to the articulated interest. 
 23 See Carpenter et al., supra note 8. 
 24 Id. at 1124–25. 
 25 Id. at 1046. Except in their specific examples, Professors Carpenter et al. do not supply a 
definition of what property is included in the “certain property” they refer to here. Later they vary the 
formulation somewhat: “because certain lands, expressions, and products are integral to indigenous 
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peoples, rather than holding property rights delineated by notions of title 
and ownership, often hold rights, interests, and obligations to preserve 
cultural property irrespective of title.”26 The stewardship model would 
transfer some of the sticks in the traditional property rights bundle to 
nonowners, who would exercise certain rights sometimes in conjunction 
with, and sometimes in place of, their exercise by the formal property 
owners.27 Importantly, the stewardship model does not predetermine 
outcomes in favor of indigenous groups. Rather, the principle mandates 
that the interests of indigenous people be taken into consideration “as 
raising legal claims that are equal to, and in some unique cases superior to, 
those of title-holders.”28 Finally, stewardship itself is divided into “dynamic 
and static stewardship,”29 whose “trajectories”30 serve as “prisms”31 for 
viewing the role of stewardship in protecting indigenous cultural property. 
Static stewardship under the model of Professors Carpenter et al. 
involves four interests of indigenous people: Conserving a sacred resource 
from overuse or pollution; placing an object, such as funerary remains, to 
rest; imposing rules against alienation to preserve the “physical and 
spiritual integrity” of an object; and access to and preservation of a cultural 
resource, such as a sacred site.32 Static stewardship thus seems to apply 
largely, if not wholly, to tangible property. To that extent, it lies outside our 
specific concern here with intangible property. Dynamic stewardship, 
however, involves at least one of three “rights”: rights of “commodification 
that govern the production of downstream cultural properties”; rights 
governing the acquisition and use of downstream cultural goods, including 
the sharing of information with nonindigenous groups; and more limited 
 
identity and group survival, they may merit expanded and particular legal protection in some cases.” Id. 
at 1089. The key word seems to be “integral” to group survival and identity, but a key unanswered 
question is, what kinds of works, exactly, are “integral” in this sense? One example these authors do 
supply is that of Aboriginal complaints in Australia to some pictures of a kangaroo and emu on various 
items of state property. Notwithstanding Aboriginal belief in the sacredness of these animals, 
stewardship does not give them any right to control the offensive use of the pictures because no 
Aboriginal person participated in the creation of the images nor did the state use traditional knowledge 
concerning the species involved. Id. at 1102. Not surprisingly, we do not quarrel with this conclusion. 
Nearly everyone would find it shocking if only Aboriginal people or their representative authorities 
could depict kangaroos or emus. The implication, however, that some sort of group right should be 
recognized where an Aboriginal person did participate in the design or the state made use of otherwise 
publicly available traditional knowledge is troubling. 
 26 Id. at 1067. 
 27 Id. at 1080. 
 28 Id. at 1083. 
 29 Id. at 1083–87. 
 30 See, e.g., id. at 1084, 1085, 1086, 1087. 
 31 See, e.g., id. at 1086, 1087. 
 32 Id. at 1085. 
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rights of “representation and attribution” with respect to commercial use of 
indigenous religious practices and identities.33 Professors Carpenter et al. 
concede that indigenous rights like attribution and commodification should 
not always win over the claims of a legitimate creator with respect to 
intellectual property.34 They do claim, however, that stewardship is “a 
uniquely powerful normative framework” for considering the claims of 
indigenous people to intangible property.35 They do not seek, for example, 
to deny outsider access to traditional medical information but rather seek to 
play a role in the development and distribution of products developed from 
such information and to receive compensation for revealing it. They claim 
that this type of information is “commonly” associated with sacred or 
confidential indigenous information,36 but they do not say that the 
stewardship model would be restricted to sacred or confidential 
information. Confidential information, at least, does stand on different 
ground from information that may be learned simply from observing open 
practices of the group or has already been disclosed, without coercion, 
outside the group.37 It is quite a different problem, however, if the objection 
is that outsiders are making an allegedly profane or otherwise objectionable 
use of known but “sacred” information. And while the notion of 
“stewardship” can be sufficiently broad to cover the protection of 
confidential information that has been improperly released, it is very 
difficult to see how “stewardship” applies to nonconfidential information. 
Finally, while one can understand the desire to share in the market benefits 
from worldwide distribution of a pharmaceutical product based on some 
aspect of indigenous but nonconfidential medical knowledge, it is difficult 
to see what “stewardship” adds to the claim. 
To fill this gap, Professors Carpenter et al. make a second 
questionable move. They correctly note that indigenous people are among 
the developing world’s poorest. Traditional medical knowledge and genetic 
resources may be the economically most important contribution that a 
given group can make to the world’s economy. Therefore, “indigenous 
peoples increasingly request to share in the profits from the products that 
are created through the use of indigenous traditional knowledge, primarily 
as a matter of survival and basic equality.”38 This ties in with their earlier 
definition of cultural property as property deserving of protection because 
 
 33 Id. at 1084. 
 34 Id. at 1087. 
 35 Id. at 1102. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Paterson, supra note 1, at 665–66. 
 38 Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 1103–04. 
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it is integral to indigenous group survival and identity.39 But the move is 
problematic. If participation in the commercialization of a downstream 
product based on indigenous knowledge is necessary to the group’s 
survival, it is not stewardship of the knowledge itself that permits the group 
survival but simply the assumed economic claim against knowledge that, in 
any other context, would be in the public domain. With only a slight 
extension of this reasoning, we could help the group to survive by granting 
it a right to share in the exploitation of the works of Shakespeare. 
Moreover, this reasoning would not apply to commercial products derived 
from indigenous knowledge where the indigenous group is independently 
well off economically, say, by reason of mineral resources on their land or 
perhaps the operation of gaming casinos. It is insufficient simply to say that 
the descendants of knowledge creators are poor so we should give them 
permanent exclusive rights to commercialize such knowledge. Were there 
any living descendants from Shakespeare, for all we know they might be 
poor, too. Fifth generation descendants of Jane Austen’s brothers have been 
heard to complain about their inability to share in the commercial benefits 
from the recent spate of Austen adaptations into television and film.40 And 
even if indigenous groups were to share in the commercialization of 
traditional medicinal knowledge, how can we know that the group will in 
fact use this survival benefit to preserve their culture, as opposed to simply 
joining the mainstream of U.S. society? Finally, Professors Carpenter et al. 
do not provide even a conceptual schematic for what kinds of 
commercializable knowledge would be subject to stewardship restrictions 
or profit sharing41 or for how profits from commercialization are to be 
calculated and divided.42 In short, if we are to take information out of the 
public domain by giving even “stewardship” rights of participation in its 
commercial development, we need a reason other than “the group is poor 
 
 39 Id. at 1046; see supra text accompanying note 25. 
 40 Amy Stevens, Poor Jane Austen Didn’t Live to See “Sense and Sensibility,” WALL ST. J., March 
25, 1996, summarized at http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/opposingcopyrightextension
/commentary/austen-wsj.html, including a response by Dennis Karjala to the nephews’ claims for profit 
sharing. 
 41 In what sense, for example, would the use of a plant to treat a given medical condition be 
“integral” to the identity or survival of the group that discovers the useful property? 
 42 Because the stewardship model supplements rather than replaces traditional property concepts, 
Professors Carpenter et al. concede “the need for regulatory oversight or mediation when title-holders 
and nonowners disagree.” Id. at 1080. However, what standards does the mediator or regulator apply in 
deciding these and the many subsidiary questions that they raise? In the case of pharmaceuticals, in 
particular, what part of the risk of unsuccessful commercialization should be borne by the group 
supplying the initial information? See Dennis S. Karjala, Sustainability and Intellectual Property Rights 
in Traditional Knowledge, 53 JURIMETRICS J. 57, 64 n.25 (2012) (noting that drug companies can invest 
hundreds of millions of dollars before having to abandon development efforts because of things like 
later-discovered side effects). 
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and this is their only potential source of subsistence.” This is not to belittle 
the problem of poverty among indigenous people, or anybody else. It is, 
rather, to say that the problem of poverty is much more important than, and 
cannot be meaningfully addressed through, ad hoc recognition of 
intellectual property rights in what is otherwise public domain information. 
The main intangible-property application that Professors Carpenter et 
al. make of their theory is to trademarks. They thereby side-step the 
difficult problem of how to apply copyright or copyright-like protection to 
indigenous cultural works of art, music, and literature, as well as the 
problem of applying patent or patent-like protection to indigenous 
information related to technology, such as herbal medicines or human or 
other genetic makeup. As discussed above,43 including trademark law under 
the rubric of “intellectual property” and then expanding conclusions from 
trademark analysis to patent and copyright is an unjustifiable leap. The 
indefinite period of trademark exclusivity is ameliorated by the extremely 
narrow scope of traditional trademark protection (using the mark falsely to 
signal the identity of the supplier of goods or services, and only then if 
consumers are confused) that essentially does not impinge on the public 
domain. 
The intangible cultural property problem to which Professors 
Carpenter et al. choose to apply their theory of stewardship is the use of 
American Indian imagery and caricatures as sports mascots.44 We may 
assume the correctness of their assertions about Native American feelings 
toward these symbols: 
For some [Native peoples], the mascots deny the truth about Indians: that they 
are active participants in dynamic and contemporary cultures that are defined 
by unique tribal identities, diverse across the continent. In this view, the 
monolithic, “mythic” Indian identity is linked to a colonizer’s attempts to 
make Indians disappear, facilitated by a legacy of death, removal, and 
assimilation. These Native peoples contend that Indian mascots portray 
Indians as nostalgic and anachronistic symbols of the past, and that their 
continued use is a manifestation of the vast power disparity faced by Indians 
today vis-à-vis whites and other minority groups. For critics of Indian 
mascots, no matter how vociferously fans contend that Indian mascots are 
meant to “honor” Native people, the actual caricatures and logos – which draw 
on stereotypes and employ sacred cultural elements such as feathers, war 
paint, songs, and drums – are an abomination.45 
 
 43 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 44 Carpenter et al., supra note 8, at 1105–06. 
 45 Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). 
15:1 (2017) The Case Against Property Rights in Old Intangible Indigenous Cultural Property 
15 
Nevertheless, this example is particularly inapt as an application of the 
stewardship principle to the limitation of an intangible property right. This 
is not simply because of the questionable nature of trademark rights as 
intellectual property.46 Even as an intellectual property right, it is standard 
intellectual property dogma that the exclusive rights are negative, that is, 
they give the legal power to prevent others from using the work but do not 
give an affirmative right to use it in any and all circumstances.47 Moreover, 
as Professor Brown has pointed out in a critical analysis of the Carpenter et 
al. proposal, most of the offensive and stereotypical uses of Indian imagery 
and references are not specific to a given tribe.48 Professors Carpenter et al. 
argue at length that the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s policy 
prohibiting the use of Native American imagery as sports mascots absent 
consent from the relevant Indian tribe created a “cognizable property 
interest”49 in the Indian nations.50 We can accept their conclusion that a few 
tribes received under this NCAA policy a practical right to participate in 
the decision whether to continue to use certain imagery as sports mascots 
by certain universities.51 But what is the property right involved in the use 
of generic Indian terms like “braves” or “warriors”? And who has the 
stewardship right to participate in the decision to allow continued use of 
such terms? The problem with sports mascots is that they reinforce 
 
 46 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 47 See, e.g., Alexander B. Pope, A Second Look at First Sale: An International Look at U.S. 
Copyright Exhaustion, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 201, 205 (2011) (“Intellectual property rights, particularly 
copyrights, provide their holders with a number of negative rights, which allow one to prevent others 
from taking specific actions”). In Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 
858 (5th Cir. 1979), the court concluded that obscenity was not a bar to copyright protection. The 
copyright would thus give its owner the right to prevent third parties from, say, publicly performing the 
work. It would not, however, give the copyright owner the affirmative right to authorize performance of 
the work in a locality in which such performance would violate the obscenity laws. Similarly, a patent 
in a pharmaceutical gives its owner the right to prevent third parties from making, using, or selling 
drugs embodying the patented invention, but the patent owner has no affirmative right to market the 
drug without regulatory approvals that are quite independent of the patent law. Trademark rights are not 
even phrased in the language of exclusivity. For example, the basic infringement provision states, “Any 
person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [use a mark in commerce, etc.] shall be 
liable. . . .” 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1). Trademark, too, is thus a negative right that creates liability in third 
parties who makes use of a mark in violation of the statute, but it does not purport to grant an 
affirmative right to the mark owner to use the mark in any way such owner chooses. A mark owner 
cannot, for example, use the mark in such a way as to deceive consumers, such as reverse passing off. 
See, e.g., Waldman Pub. Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 780 (2nd Cir. 1994). 
 48 Michael F. Brown, Culture, Property, And Peoplehood: A Comment on Carpenter, Katyal, and 
Riley’s “In Defense of Property,” 17 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 569, 571 (2010). 
 49 Carpenter et al., supra note 8 at 1111. 
 50 Id. at 1105–12. 
 51 For example, the University of Utah, after negotiations, received permission from the Ute tribe to 
continue to use the name “Utah Utes,” Id. at 1106. 
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offensive and stereotypical images of Indians in the general population.52 
That is a problem that can be addressed more coherently without the added 
complication of supposed property rights further limited by supposed 
stewardship rights. 
Professors Carpenter et al. assert that, “It is its unique flexibility and 
capacity for giving voice to claims of both owners and nonowners that 
make stewardship a uniquely powerful normative framework for 
considering indigenous peoples’ intangible property claims.”53 However, 
they never explain exactly what this “normative framework” actually is, 
and they concede that the complexity of intellectual property law will 
require variances in indigenous approaches to disputes relating to 
intangible property.54 We commend them for avoiding the “one size fits all” 
trap for all intangibles related to indigenous cultural heritage, but we query 
whether they have moved the ball very far forward in applying their 
stewardship notion to intangible cultural property. In each case or set of 
circumstances in which indigenous people demand an exception to the 
default rule that anyone may freely use information lawfully obtained, we 
need to articulate reasons for making such an exception. Only then can we 
tailor the type and scope of protection to the circumstances at hand. As 
Professors Carpenter et al. point out, the alleged misuse of human genetic 
material will raise very different issues from the adoption or modification 
into popular music of sacred indigenous music.55 
In response to Professor Michael Brown’s critical analysis of their 
stewardship proposal,56 Professors Carpenter et al. offer the following 
example of what they view as a “cultural property story” based on the 
wildly successful Twilight vampire novels by Stephenie Meyer: 
[T]he Twilight series depicts young, male members of the [Quileute] tribe as 
vampire-fighting werewolves. . . . Since Twilight’s unprecedented 
international success, the Quileute have been overwhelmed with fans and 
entrepreneurs, all grasping, quite literally in some cases, for their own piece of 
the Quileute. 
Dozens of tourists have followed in [Meyer’s] path and removed rocks from 
First Beach for their own collections. MSN.com even entered a reservation 
cemetery to film the graves of deceased tribal elders, later publishing a 
macabre video montage set to music on the Internet. Busloads of tourists roll 
 
 52 Michael F. Brown, supra note 47, at 571–72l; Kevin Gover, Native Mascots and Other 
Misguided Beliefs, AM. INDIAN MAG. (Fall 2011), at 10. 
 53 Carpenter et al., supra note 7, at 1102. 
 54 Id. at 1100–01. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Michael F. Brown, supra note 47. 
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through the reservation daily, throwing the spotlight on a tribe that never 
sought the attention. 
With the recent release of the third Twilight movie in the series, the 
commercialization of all things Quileute—from movies and books, to charm 
bracelets and earrings – has spawned a multimillion-dollar empire. Yet, little 
of this benefits the Quileute people, who remain impoverished and are 
currently devoting most of their scarce resources to a fight with the U.S. 
government over their ancestral lands. At the same time, copyright, trademark, 
and other laws protect those who have commodified Quileute culture—giving 
everyone from Stephenie Meyer, Summit Entertainment, and a dozen online 
T-shirt sellers the legal “right” to profit from so-called Quileute creations. 
This is, in our view, a cultural property story. For the Quileute, as for most 
indigenous peoples in the world, culture is tied to their lands, resources, 
language, religion, sovereignty, and the Seventh Generation. Since the arrival 
of Europeans in North America, the Quileute have suffered severe losses of all 
of these resources, with the Twilight phenomenon representing only the most 
contemporary incarnation. Yet, like other indigenous peoples, the Quileute are 
not content to sit back while others commodify their cultural heritage. Instead, 
they are using legal tools to protect their cultural resources and navigate their 
participation in contemporary commerce.57 
There are indeed many potential wrongs in this cultural property story. 
The removal of rocks and similar items as souvenirs is something that can 
be controlled by ordinary trespass and conversion rules. Cemetery 
desecration or disrespect can also be regulated by property law, perhaps 
even with some stewardship limitations depending on who owns title to the 
property in question. It takes little imagination, moreover, to understand the 
tribe’s offense at being portrayed as werewolves. Here, however, we have 
difficulty understanding how creation or modification of property rights, 
especially rights in intangibles, can meaningfully address the problem. 
Falsely labeling an item as “Indian” or “Quileute” is actionable in the 
United States,58 and if this type of protection needs strengthening, we have 
no objection to listening to suggestions. Indeed, to the extent that many 
more people now know the name “Quileute” and actively seek artifacts 
associated with that name, the Twilight series may have given the artisans 
of that community an opportunity to profit, should they so choose, to sell 
into a much larger market than had existed previously. 
 
 57 Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property 17 INT’L 
J. CULTURAL PROP. 581 (2010). They go on to describe some success in getting MSN to apologize and 
take down the graveyard video. Subsequent documentary crews have negotiated permission to film on 
the reservation, and a website was created aimed at delineating authentic Quileute-made items from 
those made by outsiders. Id. 
 58 Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990, 25 U.S.C. § 305 et seq. & 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158–59 (2012). 
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The main complaint in this “cultural property story,” therefore, seems 
to be that the Quileute have not shared in the profits from the 
“multimillion-dollar empire” that the Meyer novels have spawned.59 If this 
is true, our question is, what is the basis – legal or moral – on which such a 
claim to profit sharing can be based? Would a similar basis give profit-
sharing rights to the “victims” of Edgar Lee Masters’s thinly veiled 
descriptions of people from his hometown in the Spoon River Anthology or 
those on whom Grace Metalious based characters for Peyton Place? Every 
work is based on known or assumed cultural surroundings of some sort. A 
primary reason we have a public domain for most information concerning 
such surroundings is to avoid the need to apportion the relative merits of 
contributions to identifiable works, like literature, art, and music, that are 
created in reliance on these cultural backgrounds. 
B.? Other Suggested Approaches 
With no claim to comprehensiveness, we address here briefly the 
contributions of some recent commentators to illustrate what we regard as 
the structural framework for analyzing the problem of protecting intangible 
indigenous cultural heritage. Yuqin Jin60 argues for U.S. adoption of 
“indigenous IP laws” respecting biological and genetic knowledge but is 
unclear exactly what those laws should provide. Jin argues for a 
registration system for indigenous knowledge and mandatory disclosure of 
 
 59 The literature is replete with stories of this type. For example, Professor Riley relates how a song 
from an indigenous Taiwanese group was recorded without permission during a European tour by an 
elder who had been entrusted to act as “keeper” of the group’s traditional folk songs. The artist Enigma 
purchased rights to the recording from the French Cultural Ministry and ended up with a worldwide hit. 
Professor Riley laments the group’s inability to “control resulting violations of tribal law and blatant 
distortions of their work.” Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the Promise of Globalization: An 
Essay on Rights and Responsibilities, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 155, 158 (2004). But what, exactly, is 
the complaint here? If it is the surreptitious recording, we can place the wrong easily within the wide 
range of western legal rules that seek to regulate and prohibit deception. Indeed, such surreptitious 
recording of a musical performance would subject the recorder to the remedies for copyright 
infringement in the United States. 17 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). If the recording was sampled without the 
performer’s permission, there might be an infringement of the sound recording copyright. If the harm, 
however, is that an outsider is “distorting” the group’s musical heritage, how does that differ from a 
U.S. objection that foreigners are mangling the “Star Spangled Banner” or even Stephen Foster’s “Oh 
Suzanna!”? Here, the “keeper” of the group’s heritage performed the music outside the local realm, 
apparently voluntarily. Having returned home, that “keeper” can continue to perform and, presumably, 
guard and protect the music and its performance among the group. One cannot help thinking that the 
essence of the complaint is that someone outside the group has made money based on cultural traditions 
emanating from the group. Pete Seeger did essentially the same thing with the African song 
“Wimoweh.” Picasso took from African art, and Van Gogh took from Japanese art. That is how culture 
worldwide grows and, indeed, thrives. 
 60 Jin, supra note 6. 
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the origins of genetic resources in patent applications.61 While these 
provisions might prevent the issuance of some patents and invalidate 
others, they would not in themselves give any affirmative right of control 
over the knowledge in question or any economic compensation to the 
indigenous group that is the source of the knowledge. Jin also suggests that 
“indigenous medicine, fauna, flora, and their associated knowledge” should 
be eligible for patents, perhaps for a longer term than is provided for 
inventions generally.62 Jin acknowledges the problems of what peoples 
qualify as “indigenous” and who speaks for them.63 However, while this 
contribution does not explicitly advocate a “one size fits all” solution to the 
question of indigenous IP, it does not explain how the rights it advocates 
might vary from group to group. Nor does it attempt to address the problem 
of why indigenous knowledge, and only indigenous knowledge, should get 
treatment so radically different under IP law than we afford to all other 
types of old knowledge. Indeed, in a closing argument Jin asserts that if 
indigenous people could have patented turmeric, the subsequent litigation 
ultimately denying such a patent to “inventors” outside turmeric’s 
indigenous discoverers could have been avoided.64 The real lesson, 
however, is that patents in old knowledge should not be afforded to 
anybody, indigenous or otherwise. 
Don Marahare has reviewed the oft-cited “deficiencies” of traditional 
intellectual property law in the protection of traditional knowledge, such as 
the absence of protection for old knowledge or where no definitive author 
can be identified.65 He strongly supports the Model Law for the Protection 
of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Culture, discussed critically 
below,66 supplemented by ideas from such things as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.67 We do not review his specific suggestions, because 
 
 61 Id. at 974–75. 
 62 Id. at 975–76. 
 63 Id. at 958. 
 64 Id. at 976. Assuming turmeric was in “public use” somewhere, no patent in it could validly issue 
in that country or elsewhere. Moreover, even if a patent did validly issue in another country – for 
example, in the United States, whose former statute required use “in this country” to disqualify an 
applicant – that would have no effect on continued indigenous use by the people whose ancestors made 
the discovery, because there can be no valid patent there. Preventing outsiders from obtaining a patent 
may give some visceral satisfaction, but it brings no monetary compensation to the indigenous group or 
anyone else. 
 65 Don Marahare, Towards an Equitable Future in Vanuatu: The Legal Protection of Cultural 
Property, 8 J. SOUTH PAC. L. (2004), http://www.paclii.org/journals/fJSPL/vol08no2/6.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/D6DJ-RUA8]. 
 66 See infra notes 102–08 and accompanying text. 
 67 CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, https://www.cbd.int/undb/media/factsheets/undb-
factsheets-en-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/QUC6-BLCQ]. 
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we feel that Mr. Marahare begins from an incorrect premise, namely, that 
the goal is to achieve “maximum protection over . . . traditional 
knowledge.”68 Protection of knowledge is only half of the IP equation. 
Protection does provide some benefits to some people, but protection is 
also socially detrimental in tying up knowledge that could otherwise be 
used freely to advance both culture and technology. A move toward more 
protection is not warranted unless it can be shown that the benefits 
outweigh the costs. 
Molly Torsen recognizes the inadequacy of a one-size-fits-all 
approach to the protection of traditional cultural expression and argues that 
general principles of western law can be applied to accommodate the needs 
of traditional cultures.69 Her main concern appears to be indigenous control 
of distortion, disrespect, or commodification of traditional cultural 
expression,70 and she finds basic philosophical principles in otherwise 
apparently disparate bodies of law such as the protection of geographical 
indications,71 moral rights and copyright,72 and privacy law,73 as well as 
various international instruments.74 She also recognizes the need to balance 
indigenous claims against principles of free speech.75 Rather than a new 
body of law, she seeks a “declaration” that “traditional cultural expressions 
shall be extended an understanding of protection against usage, 
dissemination, and the making of derivative works deemed inappropriate 
by the collective people by whom the TCE was created.”76 She concedes 
ambiguity in determining what is “inappropriate” and does not supply a 
means for determining who the “collective people” are or who speaks for 
them. Presumably, after such a declaration is adopted, courts in the 
adopting countries would decide disputes on a case-by-case common law 
approach. While we perhaps lack Ms. Torsen’s confidence that such a 
declaration would actually be effective in achieving her respect and anti-
distortion goals, we see no objection to giving it a try. It is a serious attempt 
to avoid the difficulties of a one-size-fits-all approach – especially an 
 
 68 Marahare, supra note 65, at n. 5. 
 69 Molly Torsen, “Anonymous, Untitled, Mixed Media”: Mixing Intellectual Property Law with 
Other Legal Philosophies to Protect Traditional Cultural Expressions, 54 AM. COMP. L. 173, 181 
(2006). 
 70 Id. at 198. 
 71 Id. at 184–86. 
 72 Id. at 186–91. 
 73 Id. at 193–95. 
 74 See, e.g., id. at 191–92 (discussing the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 A(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)). 
 75 Id. at 182–83. 
 76 Id. at 197. 
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approach that relies on intellectual property rights in old knowledge – and 
to accommodate not only the interests of the indigenous people involved in 
a particular case but also the more general society’s interest in free speech 
and the further development of culture based on the existing cultural 
heritage. 
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been 
seeking for a number of years to come up with a proposal for protecting 
traditional knowledge (TK), traditional cultural expressions (TCE), and 
genetic resources.77 As of October 2013, developed and developing 
countries were still wrangling over the protection of folklore and TCEs. 
Even putting substantive issues of protection to the side, the parties had not 
yet agreed even as to the form of the instrument – binding treaty, 
nonbinding agreement, or some third approach.78 We strongly recommend 
that the WIPO negotiators avoid the trap of defining specific classes of 
“traditional knowledge” or “traditional cultural expressions” and 
attempting to attach new forms of IPRs to them. Starting from a well-
defined problem (such as profane use of sacred imagery) and working up to 
a narrowly tailored solution is the only way to avoid a clash with 
fundamental notions of free speech and cultural advance. 
C.? The New Zealand Wai 262 Report 
In 2011 an important report concerning the cultural rights of New 
Zealand’s indigenous Maori people was published. With no written 
constitution, New Zealand law furnishes only statutory and common law 
rights for its large Maori population. Nevertheless, the Waitangi Tribunal 
report in Ko Aotearoa Tenei: A Report into Claims Concerning New 
Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture and Identity (the “Wai 
 
 77 The Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore was established by the World Intellectual Property Organization in 2000. 
WIPO, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK 62 (2d ed. 2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en
/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf. 
 78 Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Members Endorse Plans for Talks on Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge, BLOOMBERG BIOTECH WATCH, Oct. 2, 2013. For genetic resources, developing countries 
like Brazil have been pushing for mandatory disclosure of the origin of the genetic materials that serve 
as the basis for a patent claim, in the interest of protecting against so-called “biopiracy.” The United 
States has opposed mandatory disclosure except as relevant to the traditional requirements for a patent, 
such as novelty. Daniel Pruzin, WIPO Members Endorse Negotiating Text on Protection of Genetic 
Resources, But Substantial Gaps in Positions Remain, BLOOMBERG WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (Feb. 
2012). The Director General of WIPO stated in September 2014 that “the experts have prepared the 
stage for negotiations that I hope will be able to identify an achievable and successful outcome” relating 
to action on TK, TCE, and genetic resources. Address of the Director General, WIPO Assemblies 2014, 
September 22 to 30, 2014, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/speeches/a_54_dg_speech.html 
[https://perma.cc/8Z6C-AMA6]. 
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262 report”) is likely to significantly influence future legal developments in 
New Zealand, as well as attract interest from around the world.79 
The Wai 262 report was in response to a claim originally filed in 1991 
by six Maori tribes (iwi) regarding flora, fauna, and intellectual property 
issues.80 It is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss the report in detail 
but certain aspects of the report that address issues surrounding the legal 
protection of traditional Maori knowledge and culture are relevant to our 
topic. The Wai 262 report may represent an example of the stewardship 
notion that Carpenter et al. have put forth. 
The Wai 262 report focused on the concept of Maori stewardship or 
guardianship (kaitiakitanga) – a concept of caring for natural and physical 
resources for the overall benefit of peoples and the resources themselves. 
The object of the report was to address Maori claims that the New Zealand 
government (the Crown) had failed to adequately protect, preserve, and 
respect various aspects of Maori culture and traditional knowledge. This 
meant addressing the ongoing tension between indigenous rights and 
existing intellectual property laws. The tribunal itself recognized this by 
referring to the two different (English and Maori language) versions of the 
1840 Treaty of Waitangi (between the British Crown and the Maori tribes), 
which forms the basis for the jurisdiction of the Waitangi tribunal over 
claims like Wai 262.81 The Wai 262 report centered on the language of 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. The Maori version of Article 2 
emphasizes traditional knowledge, whereas the English version affirms 
western concepts of property, with its use of such terms as “preemption” 
and “alienation”. Nevertheless, inherent in the fact that the two different 
versions of the treaty are of equal authority is the idea that Maori were 
ceding sovereignty to the (then British) Crown, in exchange for retaining 
possession of their own lands and other resources.82 Even if the tribunal 
finds that the Crown has breached its duty towards Maori based on the 
treaty, this does not necessarily mean such breaches are remediable under 
New Zealand law. However, the the tribunal’s identification of violations 
 
 79 The report was published in three volumes, the first of which summarizes its findings and 
recommendations. See David V. Williams, Ko Aotearoa Tenei: Law and Policy Affecting Maori Culture 
and Identity, 20 INT’L. J. CUL. PROP. 311 (2013). 
 80 See Graeme W. Austin, Re-Treating Intellectual Property? The Wai 262 Proceeding and the 
Heuristics of Intellectual Property Law, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L. & COMP. L., 333 (2003). 
 81 The 1840 Treaty was neglected by the New Zealand legal system but achieved constitutional 
status through the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975. See id. at 341–51. The tribunal is a 
quasi-judicial body which hears claims by Maori alleging violations by the Crown of the principles 
contained in the treaty. 
 82 Many argue that the Maori version of the treaty did not cede sovereignty in the strict English 
sense of the term but something less and more akin to some sort of authority. See Austin, supra note 80, 
at 342–43. 
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by the Crown of treaty provisions often leads to the New Zealand 
government’s introducing changes in legislation, policies, and practices 
affecting Maori. 
The Wai 262 report addressed the concept of the public domain by 
noting that while Maori possession of its traditional knowledge was, prior 
to European settlement, undisturbed, it is now a shared resource, and, in 
that sense, irretrievable. While this may seem self-evident, it was an 
important conclusion, since it implicitly rejected the idea of creating sui 
generis intellectual property rights for Maori traditional knowledge.83 
Instead, the tribunal’s report focused on the stewardship principle, which it 
saw as itself a key component of Maori culture. In so doing the report also 
sided with the vast majority of contemporary legal scholarship which 
concludes that indigenous traditional knowledge is an ill fit with western 
intellectual property concepts. 
The tribunal thought that there needed to be restrictions in place to 
prevent the offensive or derogatory public use of Maori forms of cultural 
expression.84 While New Zealand law already protects against such use to a 
certain extent, the tribunal recommended enhanced protection where 
someone had an existing custodial or guardianship relationship (kaitiaki) to 
the objects and beliefs in question. The report proposes that the existing 
Maori Trade Marks Advisory Committee be replaced by a new 
Commission that would establish guidelines for prospective users of Maori 
cultural expressions. This Commission could also serve as a register of the 
guardians of particular works, but such registration would not be made 
compulsory. The idea of a prohibition on offensive or derogatory use of 
Maori works seems appropriate enough and has well-established 
precedents in other countries with significant indigenous populations – 
such as Canada and the United States. What is more problematic about the 
tribunal’s proposals is what exactly it is that can be subject to a 
“guardianship” relationship and afforded legal protection on that basis. 
Since these relationships appear to be subject to definition on a case-by-
case basis, it would seem that there could be a good deal of uncertainty as 
to when a given use is protected, along with the precise nature of the level 
of protection itself. 
The most controversial aspect of the report’s recommendations 
surrounds its suggestion that any commercial use of Maori culture that is 
the subject of a “guardianship” relationship requires consultation with and 
 
 83 See Jessica Christine Lai, Maori Traditional Cultural Expressions and the WAI 262 Report: 
Looking at Details, 8 (U. Lucerne, Switzerland, i-call Working Paper No. 2012/02) (2012). 
 84 See Owen Morgan, Protecting Indigenous Signs and Trade Marks – the New Zealand 
Experience, INTELL. PROP. Q., 58 (2004). 
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possibly consent from kaitiaki before use. It should be stressed, however, 
that this recommendation is based on the tribunal’s understanding of the 
obligations of the New Zealand Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi. As 
explained in the report, while western-based intellectual property concepts 
define specific legal rights connected to certain forms of property, Maori 
focus on relationships towards their cultural objects (taonga) and the duties 
and responsibilities that surround these relationships. The recommendation 
that consent be required to allow the commercial use of Maori cultural 
objects is basically a suggestion that New Zealand law make such consent 
mandatory – whether or not the works concerned are in the public domain. 
It remains unclear how such a requirement would be implemented and what 
sort of recognition it would receive outside New Zealand. 
Even if this requirement of consent for expressions of Maori 
traditional knowledge were made part of New Zealand law, it is not clear 
what it exactly entails. The report does not explain what would happen if 
consent were refused – even assuming there had been prior consultation. 
Furthermore, the report recommends that the Commission have the power 
to limit commercial use of Maori cultural expressions in a form that the 
would-be user already has intellectual property rights over – like a 
photograph. Would this mean, for example, that the owner of copyright in a 
photograph could not display it for sale in a gallery if the kaitiaki of its 
subject matter objected? 
The report grapples with this problem by suggesting that while 
existing intellectual property rights cannot be compromised, any future 
rights would be subject to decisions of the Commission. Thus, a design 
might be refused registration under the existing statutory scheme if the 
Commission decided that there had been inadequate consultation or an 
absence of consent. In effect, existing intellectual property rights might be 
made subject to laws giving effect to Treaty of Waitangi principles. This, 
however, would take the regulation beyond commercial uses of the subject 
matter. Indeed, refusal to recognize intellectual property rights would not 
address the basis for a stewardship rejection of commercial exploitation, 
which must inhere in the offensiveness of such exploitation. That a work is 
not protected by, say, copyright does not mean it cannot be published or 
sold. It only means that its creator has no exclusive rights to such 
publication or sale. 
The report distinguished between what it described as “taonga-works” 
(Maori treasures or highly prized possessions) and “taonga-derived works”. 
While the former are assumed to always have living individuals or 
communities that are responsible for them, the latter are works that have a 
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Maori element but this is in combination with other non-Maori influences.85 
For these, there is no kaitiaki relationship. The report suggests that while 
derivative works be made subject to restrictions on offensive or derogatory 
use, they not be subject to consultation or consent because of the absence 
of guardians. In her analysis of the report, Dr. Jessica Christine Lai has 
said: 
It would seem to the author here that the distinction cannot be made 
objectively and that the line between the two seems conceptually porous. As 
has been stated elsewhere, the opinion of Maori is by no means lacking in 
diversity, making it difficult to objectively and consistently answer the 
question of how much Western or “modern” material must make up a work 
for it to no longer be considered a taonga work but a taonga-derived work. 
Considering that Maori culture should be viewed as dynamic and constantly 
developing, how does one differentiate between this acceptable development 
(which may involve incorporating in aspects not of traditional Maori culture) 
and hybrids that cross the line and become taonga-derived works? This further 
begs the question of whether the racial descent of the creator is important 
towards this end. In other words, is one more willing to consider something a 
taonga work, rather than a taonga-derived work, if its creator is Maori in 
descent? If so, is that a justifiable distinction to make? Notably, this would not 
go both ways, as non-Maori can only make taonga-derived works, due to the 
requirement of a kaitiaki relationship.86 
Given the significance of the consultation and consent requirement, it 
is surprising that the report did not address these inherent problems more 
closely. In effect, the report is dealing here with the concept of “fair use” or 
its equivalent, which in most legal systems is seen as ensuring a basis for 
new interpretations and other creative expressions. If the concept of 
“taonga-derived works” were interpreted narrowly, it would place a 
significant and undesirable restriction on such creativity. This example 
illustrates the need to articulate the basis for limiting the right to use 
information freely. The justification for any right of refusal must inhere in a 
notion of sacrilege or similar offensive use of the underlying work. 
Assuming we can actually identify what is “offensive” and quantify how 
much “offensiveness” must be present to justify a refusal to allow 
commercial exploitation – each an extraordinarily difficult problem in a 
society that believes in rights of free expression – any refusal should be 
predicated not on the quantity of underlying indigenous content that finds 
its way into the challenged work but on the aspects of the challenged work 
 
 85 This assumption itself seems highly questionable given that there are thousands of Maori 
artifacts in New Zealand and foreign museums alone whose tribunal affiliation is unknown. 
 86 See Lai, supra note 83, at 12. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
26 
that make the work offensive. It should be clear that a desire to share in the 
profits to be derived from the proposed commercial exploitation should not 
be a factor in justifying a refusal to allow commercial exploitation. 
Another controversial aspect of the report is its suggestion that certain 
Maori traditional knowledge (matauranga Maori) that is “closely-held” be 
afforded additional protection beyond merely a prohibition on offensive or 
derogatory use. This is the closest the report gets to addressing what level 
of legal protection could be afforded intangible Maori culture. While 
unable to define the content of such Maori culture, the tribunal thought that 
traditional knowledge that was specific to particular Maori communities 
should enjoy some level of protection – possibly against offensive or 
derogatory use, as well as requirements of consultation and consent. As 
with Maori works more generally, there are troubling questions here 
surrounding how and when such use should or could be controlled. In 
addition, as Dr. Lai has pointed out, there is a good deal of uncertainty as to 
what exactly “closely-held” means.87 She ponders from whose perspective 
such intangible cultural heritage would be considered as “closely-held.” As 
she goes on to say, the report also fails to address the possible misuse by 
Maori themselves of Maori culture. The report discusses the rights of 
Maori versus non-Maori, but it does not explain how its recommendations 
apply in other contexts – such as Maori misuse of Maori culture.88 Again, 
articulation of the reasons justifying any deviation from the default rule that 
information should be freely useable by anyone is necessary both in 
determining the existence and scope of the right and the basis, if any, for 
distinguishing between Maori and non-Maori use of the knowledge. 
Some aspects of the tribunal’s report do speak to general issues 
concerning the basis for affording legal protection to indigenous cultural 
heritage. What is most striking about the report is that it completely avoids 
any suggestion that new forms of property rights be created in respect of 
Maori cultural heritage. The explanations for this are likely many, but the 
most likely must be the daunting task of defining the content of such rights 
and explaining how they would co-exist with pre-existing norms. New 
Zealand has struggled over the last few decades to resolve its identity 
through a new kind of engagement between its Maori and non-Maori 
(pakeha) populations. The Wai 262 report is just one facet of this tortuous 
journey. It would seem its authors chose “stewardship” together with all its 
attendant uncertainties, over ownership, with the aim of avoiding the sort of 
confrontation that a rights-based approach might have engendered. In so 
 
 87 Id. at 13. 
 88 Id. at 13–14. 
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doing they may have merely designed a roadmap with its own particular set 
of problems concerning implementation and dissonance. 
D.? Taiwan 
In 2007, Taiwan enacted the Act for the Protection of the Traditional 
Intellectual Creations of Indigenous Peoples (“the Act”).89 While it has 
received relatively scant attention outside Taiwan, the Act represents a 
significant example of emerging efforts to provide additional protection for 
the traditional cultures of indigenous peoples.90 Unfortunately, the Taiwan 
statute is more an example of what should not be done for the protection of 
indigenous cultural heritage than what should be done. 
Article 1 of the Act states a purpose to protect the “traditional 
intellectual creations” of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, as well as to 
promote the overall development of Taiwan’s indigenous culture. Article 3 
of the Act defines the scope of the “intellectual creations” the law is 
designed to protect in terms of their being expressed in such forms as 
ceremonies, songs, weaving, and clothing. This means that the ideas on 
which such manifestations are based are not protected by the Act. 
However, it is unclear whether the word “creations” limits the protection 
the Act affords to cultural expressions that are in some way novel, rather 
than mere repetitions of traditional concepts.91 What is clear is that the Act 
is about cultural “expressions” rather than indigenous ecological traditional 
knowledge which is to be the subject of a separate law.92 
To receive the protection of the Act, “traditional intellectual creations” 
are required to be registered pursuant to a government-run system set up 
under the Act.93 A group, including experts, scholars and indigenous 
representatives will vet applications under the Act. The rights that 
registration confers are limited to aboriginal groups or tribes, and 
representatives are to be elected to represent the appropriate body. 
Exclusive rights can be awarded to a group or tribe, or several tribes and 
groups jointly, but if no group or tribe can be determined to own the 
 
 89 See Lawbank, Protection Act for the Traditional Intellectual Creations of Indigenous Peoples, 
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/Eng/FLAW/FLAWDAT0202.asp [https://perma.cc/F66E-4ESF]. 
 90 It has been pointed out that the Act strongly resembles Panamanian law. See Chih-Chieh Yang, A 
Comparative Study of the Models Employed to Protect Indigenous Traditional Cultural Expressions, 11 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 49, 62–63 (2010). 
 91 See Kai-Shyh Lin, Using Intellectual Property Rights to Protect Indigenous Cultures: Critique 
on the Recent Development in Taiwan, 67 J. ARCHAEOLOGY & ANTHROPOLOGY 185–220, 195 (2007). 
 92 See Ming-Yan Shieh & Chung-His Lee, Taiwan in THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM LAWS ON THE 
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE PRESERVATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 745, 755 (Toshiyuki Kono ed., 2010). 
 93 Protection Act, supra note 89, Arts. 4– 6. 
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“intellectual creation” rights in it shall be registered in the name of the 
indigenous peoples of Taiwan as a whole.94 
The legal nature of the rights protected under the Act are set out in 
Articles 11, 12 and 13. The exclusive right to exploit an “intellectual 
creation” is defined as comprising “the property and moral rights of the 
intellectual creations.” Moral rights are defined as including the right to 
release the work, to identify an exclusive user and the right to prevent 
distortion, mutilation or modification of the work in a manner that violates 
the author’s reputation.95 Rights are inalienable and non-transferable, and, if 
abandoned (or if a tribe or group ceases to exist), automatically revert to 
the aboriginal peoples of Taiwan.96 Proceeds (such as royalties) derived by 
a tribe or group from rights cannot be used by individual persons for their 
own benefit but are to become part of an indigenous peoples welfare fund.97 
The Act eschews protection through the registration of names or 
marks in favor of property rights over certain manifestations of indigenous 
culture, which are rights to be held, apparently in perpetuity, by indigenous 
groups. As Professor Yang has pointed out, many traditional cultural 
expressions are regarded as sacred, and turning them into property rights 
may be seen by many as inappropriate. This relates to the recurrent 
problem of being able to define ownership when the origins of the 
traditional knowledge may itself be unclear.98 Of much greater importance, 
however, is the fundamental problem of giving property rights in old 
information – and most especially perpetual property rights in old 
information. In terms of the policy analysis outlined above, the question 
must always be why new IPRs are being recognized.99 What problem, 
exactly, is solved by recognizing property rights in old information? What 
is lacking in this statute is a normative basis for the level of protection it 
affords. Why does Taiwan protect indigenous cultural heritage differently 
from other parts of its cultural heritage? The answer cannot lie solely in 
what indigenous people want (assuming that they are unified on the point). 
Many western authors today clamor for longer, even perpetual, copyright 
rights. The issue is whether the claims have legitimacy in the context of 
society as a whole. 
The title of the Act has been criticized as suggesting that its subject-
matter consists of all of the traditional intellectual knowledge of Taiwan’s 
 
 94 Id. Art. 7. 
 95 Id. Art. 10. 
 96 Id. Arts. 11, 12, 15. 
 97 Id, Art. 14. 
 98 Yang, supra note 90, at 62. 
 99 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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indigenous peoples, whereas its actual scope is much more limited.100 The 
law deliberately omits biological knowledge and is primarily based on the 
provisions of earlier Taiwanese intellectual property laws. An even more 
serious concern is that the Act fails to adequately address the problem of 
deciding who is the appropriate representative for the rights claimed. With 
thirteen indigenous groups, there are many possibilities for uncertainty over 
which group has the best claim to a particular “intellectual creation.” Many 
practices may be shared or no longer practiced. On the other hand, 
registration suggests stasis and restraint of the fluid cross-fertilization of 
ideas and practices between cultures. The Act may “privilege certain 
interpretations of this tradition and render others ‘inauthentic’ and less 
‘genuine’.”101 Even worse, where no tribe or group can be identified as the 
source, the information remains the restricted property of the aboriginal 
people of Taiwan instead of reverting to the public domain. What basis can 
there possibly be for such restrictions on the use of cultural information? In 
terms of western culture, this is analogous to recognizing a new property 
right in the works of Homer in the country of Greece or some subset of its 
current population. It goes without saying that the lucky members of any 
group entitled to royalties would be pleased with such a new property right 
in the works of Homer. But would the world, or even Greece, be better off 
if members of that group had sole right of control over new translations and 
interpretations of these classic works? 
Kai-Shih Lin has suggested that a probable effect of the Act could be 
that artists will avoid using Taiwanese cultural expressions as a basis for 
new works because of fear of contravening the new law.102 This could mean 
that Taiwanese indigenous cultures become isolated and of less interest to 
outsiders so that the registration under the Act becomes pointless. 
Copyright law is not extraterritorial, which means that no other country is 
bound to recognize the rights Taiwan affords to its indigenous groups. 
Outsiders would be free to appropriate from these groups at will, so long as 
all their underlying source material is obtained legally and all reproduction 
and derivative work preparation takes place outside of Taiwan. Taiwanese 
authors, however, would be severely hampered in their ability to make use 
of their own cultural heritage in the creation of new works. This cannot be 
considered a positive development for current authors in Taiwan. 
 
 100 Kai-Shih Lin, supra note 91, at n.196 ff. 
 101 Id. at 207. Using the problem of sports mascots as a jump-off point, Professor Mezey has 
pointed out not just the inevitability but the important social value of cultural change, hybridity, and 
fusion. Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2039–45 
(2007). 
 102 Id. at 208–12. 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
30 
E.? The Pacific Island Countries Regional Framework 
The Model Law for the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and 
Expressions of Culture derives from a Pacific Regional Framework aimed 
at assisting Pacific Island countries that wish to legislate new protection of 
traditional knowledge (TK) and expressions of culture (EOCs).103 This 
Model Law suffers from the same fundamental errors as the Taiwan statute 
discussed above. The Model Law very broadly defines “expressions of 
culture” and “traditional knowledge”104 and requires “prior and informed 
consent” from the “traditional owners” before performing just about any 
“non-customary” act one can imagine doing with traditional knowledge or 
expressions of culture other than privately thinking about them.105 The 
rights endure in perpetuity.106 The traditional owners, who are the ones 
authorized to give permission for non-customary uses, are the indigenous 
groups or the individuals recognized by the groups to whom protection is 
entrusted according to the customary practices of the groups.107 The Model 
Law has a procedure for identifying the traditional owners,108 but if no 
traditional owners can be identified, the determining agency (the “Cultural 
Authority”) may deem itself the “traditional owner” and must use any 
benefits derived “for traditional cultural development purposes.”109 No 
justification is offered – indeed, there seems to be no recognition of the 
 
 103 Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Regional Framework for the Protection of Traditional 
Knowledge and Expressions of Culture (2002) [hereinafter referred to as the Model Law], 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/PacificModelLaw,ProtectionofT
KandExprssnsofCulture20021.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH49-HCPM] 
 104 Traditional knowledge is defined to include “any knowledge that generally: (a) is or has been 
created, acquired or inspired for traditional economic, spiritual, ritual, narrative, decorative or 
recreational purposes; and (b) is or has been transmitted from generation to generation; and (c) is 
regarded as pertaining to a particular traditional group, clan or community of people in 
[Enacting country]; and (d) is collectively originated and held.” “Expressions of culture” mean “any 
way in which traditional knowledge appears or is manifested.” Model Law, cl. 4. The Model 
Law does not appear to specify who is to do the “regarding” in clause (c) of the TK definition to 
determine whether the knowledge relates to a particular group. 
 105 In addition to reproduction, importation, translation, and similar acts, the Model Law has a 
catch-all for any use of “traditional knowledge or expressions of culture in any other material 
form,” if such use is non-customary. The Model Law expressly requires authorization for the creation 
of “derivative works,” which are defined broadly as “any intellectual creation or innovation based 
upon or derived from traditional knowledge or expressions of culture.” Model Law cl. 4. Even a 
highly creative work that takes no more than a copyright-unprotected “idea” from TK or EOP could 
require authorization as “derived from” such TK or EOP. “Customary use” is defined as “the use of 
traditional knowledge or expressions of culture in accordance with the customary laws and 
practices of the traditional owners.” Customary uses are not regulated by the Model Law. Id. cl. 5. 
 106 Id. at cl. 9. 
 107 Id. at cl. 4. The Model Law does provide a kind of “fair use” exception from the protections. 
 108 Id. at cls. 17–18. 
 109 Id. at cl. 19. 
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problem – for the economic inefficiency of protecting information in 
perpetuity, for protecting information to which no one can claim 
ownership, or for inhibiting further cultural development by creative 
people, whether inside or outside the group, who base new works on 
existing TK or EOCs, no matter how old or how tenuous the “ownership” 
claim. 
Miranda Forsyth offers a cogent critical analysis of the Pacific Island 
Model Law as insufficiently considering the interrelationship between 
customary legal institutions, TK, and the indigenous communities TK 
protection is intended to serve.110 She points out the problems of intra-group 
disputes over allowed uses and economic benefit sharing,111 unrealistic 
benefit expectations by group members,112 the need to deal with property 
already in the public domain,113 and the stifling of internal use and 
development by TK owners themselves.114 Forsyth recommends a “deep 
pluralistic approach” to the problem of TK protection that works from the 
ground up, beginning with each individual community itself determining 
what the local people’s needs and desires actually are in drawing an 
appropriate balance between such aims as conservation and 
commercialization.115 She argues that the state should be a facilitator, not a 
regulator, in helping local communities devise and enforce decisions 
concerning TK, such as (presumably) secret or sacred knowledge and 
perhaps, as we have suggested, developing systems of certification marks 
for different communities.116 A central goal would be a system facilitating 
access by local communities to their own TK and to the TK of neighboring 
communities.117 
We agree with a general approach that looks concretely at specific 
problems in the real world rather than one-size-fits-all abstractions. Sacred 
and secret information is different from information that has long been 
available to, and used by, people inside and outside the group from which 
the information first derived. It is only by identifying specific claims to 
 
 110 Miranda Forsyth, Do You Want It Gift Wrapped?: Protecting Traditional Knowledge in the 
Pacific Island Countries, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ INNOVATION 206 (P. Drahos & S. Frankel eds. 
2012), press.anu.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ch09.pdf. 
 111 Id. at 206–07. 
 112 Id. at 207–08. 
 113 Id. at 208–09. For example, in many cases the TK has already “escaped” and is being used by 
outsiders, who may themselves be members of indigenous groups but not the group to which the TK 
“belongs” under the Model Law. 
 114 Id. at 209–10. 
 115 Id. at 211–12. 
 116 Id. at 212–13. 
 117 Id. at 213. 
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specific knowledge and evaluating those claims in the light of a group’s 
interest in maintaining a degree of control and society’s interest in the free 
flow of information that we can effect the set of compromises that must 
underlie any realistic system of TK protection.   
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON SUI GENERIS APPROACHES 
We have suggested approaches to the protection of intangible cultural 
heritage outside the framework of IPRs, such as through tort law, contract 
law, rights of privacy, and analogies to trademark and trade secret law.118 
We will not reiterate that discussion here. Rather, we wish to reaffirm the 
need to articulate specific legitimate interests that some indigenous people 
or groups may have in certain information or classes of information. Sacred 
information relating to religious rites that is not generally known provides 
one of the clearest examples. To the extent such information exists, and the 
groups in question wish to maintain its secrecy, we can imagine a statutory 
solution modeled on privacy and trade secret protection that could serve the 
legitimate interests of the group. On the other hand, where the information 
is publicly known and not otherwise eligible for protection under the 
existing IPR regimes, it is difficult for us to see any case for general control 
rights in the group that was the original source of the information. Between 
these two extremes, arguments can and should be made on a case-by-case 
basis, with focus always on the harm that is being suffered from outsider 
use of the information in question and whether that harm justifies 
limitations on free speech and the dissemination of knowledge. 
We recognize that, at bottom, we are choosing sides in a fundamental 
value conflict. The default position of most western societies is that 
publicly available information, being nonrival, is free for all to use, subject 
to the IPR regimes for new information and subject to specific uses of 
information that threaten identifiable harms (e.g., crying “Fire!” in a 
crowded theater, even if there is an actual fire). Many defenders of 
exclusive rights in intangible indigenous cultural property disagree that this 
default position should apply to indigenous groups. The reasons these 
defenders have thus far given for their position, however, are not 
convincing. That many wrongs have been perpetrated against many 
indigenous groups all over the world, often over the course of centuries, is 
undeniable. How to compensate for these wrongs to the extent possible is a 
vital subject of public discourse and potential legal development. 
Recognizing exclusive control rights, or even more limited “stewardship” 
 
 118 Robert K. Paterson & Dennis S. Karjala, supra note 1, at 652–69. 
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rights, in old information, however, is simply not a remedy that in any way, 
except by chance, relates to the wrong. 
In each case, we need to ask whether a right equivalent to the one 
proposed for indigenous groups should be recognized for nonindigenous 
groups otherwise similarly situated. Can and should we afford exclusive 
control over the origin stories of indigenous groups while denying such 
control to the Greeks over Homer? There is a clear and easily articulated 
basis for the default position that information is and must be free, with at 
least articulated reasons for the exceptions relating to traditional IPRs. 
There is nothing in that basis that distinguishes between information 
deriving from particular groups, indigenous or otherwise. The burden is 
therefore on those seeking stronger indigenous group rights in old 
information to articulate clearly whatever basis they see for deviating from 
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